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The EU and Israel - Partnership  
and the weight of history 
Toby Vogel 
ifty years ago, in June 1967, a short but fierce war between Israel and its neighbours 
changed the map of the Middle East and transformed both Israeli politics and its relations 
with the wider world in ways that are still felt today. The Six-Day War created an enduring 
cycle of Israeli occupation, Palestinian resistance, terror, and Israeli repression. The Arab defeat 
of 1967 also led to the formation of a Palestinian national movement, at the time embodied by 
the Palestine Liberation Organization.  
The most immediate outcome of the war was Israel’s occupation of the Sinai Peninsula, the 
Gaza Strip, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights, all condemned in UN Security 
Council Resolution 242 of November 1967. Israel later handed Sinai back to Egypt and withdrew 
from Gaza and some of the West Bank, but still maintains an iron grip on both territories, which 
have also witnessed accelerated settlement construction under Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu. Israel has not only flouted countless UN Security Council resolutions, it has also 
committed widespread human rights violations and war crimes, notably during the war in Gaza 
in August 2014.  
David Ben-Gurion, the country’s founding prime minister, said a few months after the Six Day 
War:  
If I have to choose between a small Israel, without territories, but with peace, and a 
greater Israel without peace, I prefer a small Israel.  
In pursuing a hardline course, Israel’s leadership dismissed Ben-Gurion’s views as out-of-touch 
sentimentality. Ben-Gurion’s position was not an expression of human kindness: he was seeking 
to preserve Israel as a Jewish homeland, which would be impossible with a large share of Arabs 
on its territory. But he also understood that the permanent occupation of Gaza and the West 
Bank would undermine Israel’s security and its democratic institutions. 
F 
2 | TOBY VOGEL 
 
Mutual incomprehension 
Netanyahu’s terms in office – he was prime minister in 1996-99 and again after 2009 – saw a 
sharp deterioration in relations with the EU. Seen from Jerusalem, the EU appears to be siding 
with the Palestinians; it is the Palestinian authority’s largest donor, and some member states, 
including France, were early champions of Palestinian statehood.  
Seen from Brussels and member state capitals, the Israeli government appears to be doing all 
it can to torpedo accommodation with the Palestinian leadership and to make life miserable 
for ordinary Palestinians. Despite Israeli claims, however, the EU’s sympathy for the Palestinians 
does not extend to the Islamists of Hamas who control the Gaza Strip. 
The start of the ‘Arab Spring’ in 2011 created a strategic environment that was even less 
conducive to a peace deal between Israel and Palestine and to the two-state solution that had 
been the basis of the Madrid conference and the Oslo accords dating back to the early 1990s – 
a peace process that today exists in name only. Israel’s sense of being under threat from its 
neighbours increased dramatically with the civil war in Syria. Syria had fashioned itself as the 
leader of the resistance against Israel, but both Hafez al Assad and his son Bashar acted as 
rational and restrained, if hostile, neighbours to the Jewish state. (Syria’s ageing, Soviet-era 
hardware was also no match for Israel’s state of the art armour, including, most prominently, 
the Iron Dome missile defence, deployed in 2011.) 
By contrast, the prospect of Islamists taking control of southern Syria, or indeed of all of the 
country, alarmed the Israelis, who are also fearful of turmoil in Jordan and Egypt. Here, too, 
European perceptions diverge sharply from those in Israel: the EU’s embrace of the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi, the first (and so far, only) freely elected president of Egypt, 
was seen in Israel as further evidence that Europeans were soft on terrorism. At the same time, 
the war in Syria and anarchy in Libya – a gateway for migration to Europe – made pursuing an 
Israeli-Palestinian peace deal less pressing for the Europeans, even as the war in Gaza was 
raging. The international community has in effect made an accommodation with the status quo 
in the occupied territories, however uneasy it may be. 
The EU: still punching below its weight 
In a broader sense, the Israel-Palestine issue is an example of the EU’s inability to translate 
close trade and cultural relations into diplomatic clout. The EU keeps rebuilding infrastructure 
in the occupied territories only to see it destroyed, time and again, by Israel. It keeps buying 
goods from Israel – for a total of €13.2 billion last year – but has very little political influence in 
return (trade excludes goods produced on occupied territory). It keeps protesting against the 
illegal occupation or the building of new settlements, yet its appeals go unheeded by the Israeli 
leadership. Israeli researchers and students take part in EU funding programmes such as 
Horizon 2020, but that does not seem to temper Israeli hostility towards the EU, which is 
especially pronounced in the current government.  
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At the same time, however, the relationship is undeniably close, and strong – just not in political 
terms. The Union’s insistence on excluding goods from the occupied territories and its calls for 
Israel to end the occupation are preventing the upgrade of an Association Agreement that took 
effect in 2000. 
The mutual lack of understanding between Israel and the EU is no surprise. The EU is a 
community of law that views the promotion of international norms and values as a core tenet 
of its diplomacy. Israel is a robust democracy domestically, with fiercely contested elections 
and a lively, pluralistic media, although recent years have seen illiberal developments. Among 
other things, traditional print titles are being squeezed by the freely distributed Israel Hayom, 
a mouthpiece of the Netanyahu government; and a law imposing special reporting 
requirements on non-governmental groups that receive foreign funding is clearly targeted at 
leftist human-rights groups. But if Israel’s democracy looks healthy on the inside, it has for 
decades been flouting international law in the knowledge that it would be protected by the 
Americans in the UN Security Council.  
The EU, by contrast, is in some respects founded on post-national principles, while Israel 
defines itself as the state of the Jewish people and is deeply attached to its sovereignty, which 
it will defend by force against the Palestinians’ national ambitions. Despite these basic 
incompatibilities, strong ties have grown even stronger over the years, turning Israel into one 
of the EU’s closest neighbours.  
Change in sight? 
It is hard to see how this fundamental dynamic is going to change, even as the Netanyahu 
government pursues its hardline agenda. And with the support of the Trump administration the 
two-state solution is being asphyxiated. With Israel’s domestic politics having shifted 
dramatically to the right over the past decade or so, a loss of power for Netanyahu’s Likud party 
or the prime minister’s removal over an ongoing corruption investigation would change little 
with regards to attitudes towards the Palestinians, and hence relations with the EU. At the same 
time, the regional setting, with wars ongoing in Syria, Yemen, and Iraq; low-intensity conflict in 
Libya; and increasing competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran, shows little sign of improving. 
The EU, for its part, cannot compromise its founding values, such as respect for international 
law for the sake of a close ally – nor should it.  
In fact, all signs point towards the status quo – the continuation of a close but unhappy 
relationship between Israel and the EU, tainted by realities that were created half a century 
ago. 
